



UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

Good Practices in the area of Border Security and Management in the context of Counterterrorism: The Republic of Korea Model





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The Republic of Korea Model

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Glossary

3T	Test, Trace, and Treatment
BSM	Border Security and Management
CDSCH	Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters
CIQ	Customs, Immigration and Quarantine
CT	Counterterrorism
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighter
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
iAPI	Interactive Advanced Passenger Information
IBMS	Integrated Border Management System
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
INSS	Institute for National Security Studies
INTERPOL	International Crime Police Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KCDC	Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
KCG	Korea Coast Guard
KCS	Korea Customs Service
KDCA	Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency
KIDES	Korea Immigration Service Document Examination Section
KIS	Korea Immigration Service
KNPA	Korean National Police Agency

MND	Ministry of National Defense
MOF	Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOHW	Ministry of Health and Welfare
MOIS	Ministry of Interior and Security
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOLIT	Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRTC	Migration Research and Training Centre
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Center
NFA	National Fire Agency
NIS	National Intelligence Service
QR	Quick Response
ROK	Republic of Korea
UN	United Nations
UNCCT	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre
UNOCT	United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WCO	World Customs Organization
WHO	World Health Organization

Preface

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic, causing numerous countries to close their airports, ports, and land borders in inconsistent and frenzied ways to try to contain the spread of the virus. Even such longstanding border security and management policies as the Schengen Arrangement in Europe were called into question, as global infection rates skyrocketed in the first few months, and continued to ebb and resurge throughout the following years. As a result, international travel restrictions varied widely from country to country throughout the pandemic and shifted frequently as governments struggled to find the right mix of precautions to provide their domestic constituents with a sense that the situation was under control and that foreign goods and travelers were not contributing to the spread.

While many countries employed temporary (or in some cases, prolonged) border closures or blanket bans of visitors from certain cities, regions or states, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was heralded for its ability to quickly respond and adapt to the pandemic conditions without severe disruptions to daily life, the functioning of democracy, or border management. Its all-of-government approach to pandemic management was aided by a strong counterterrorism infrastructure that included institutions, processes and channels of communication that allowed for swift inter-agency cooperation and responses. Being able to increase health and security screening policies and procedures as part of pandemic-era border security management allowed the country to keep its main airports and ports fully operational, without major foreigner-driven outbreaks in the country.

This compendium seeks to highlight the good practices the ROK employed to adapt its border security management in a time of global crisis, while also providing recommendations for how other countries can strengthen and dynamize their counterterrorism and border security practices to be better equipped to respond to evolving transnational security threats.

We offer a sincere thanks to all our colleagues from the Korean government who provided relevant and precious input into the preparation of this document, in particular our colleagues from the ROK MOFA: Mr. Sung-Hwa Jang, Director for the Counterterrorism Cooperation Team, International Security Division, International Organization Bureau, and his colleague the Second Secretary Ms. Gae-Un Lee for their unfathomable commitment and dedication to the successful completion of this common enterprise.

Executive Summary

In 2016, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) in cooperation with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) published a manual of good practices to serve as guidelines for governments for developing policies and practices regarding effective border security and management (BSM) in the context of counterterrorism (CT) activities. This addendum builds on the 2016 manual, using the Republic of Korea (ROK) as an example of a country that has built a strong and effective CT culture—especially in terms of BSM—despite having a low perceived threat of terrorism. Furthermore, it highlights the ROK’s notable ability to quickly adapt its BSM practices during the COVID-19 pandemic to maintain an open border while preventing major influxes of foreigner-driven infections.

While many countries establish or strengthen their CT efforts in response to a major incident, the ROK has smartly invested in preparation and prevention. Its early government-level CT efforts were largely driven by its selection to host the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics. Later events outside of the ROK’s borders, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 and the 2004 kidnapping and execution of a ROK national in Iraq, underscored the need to adapt to an evolving security environment, and to participate in global efforts to combat terrorism.

Research of the ROK’s current BSM practices in the context of CT and COVID-19 was conducted over the course of a year, coordinated through the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)/UNCCT in conjunction with the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), including two country visits in 2021. It aimed to identify the ROK’s legal framework, procedures, and challenges in implementing CT BSM measures, particularly in response to special circumstances like the COVID-19 pandemic. A detailed questionnaire was also distributed to 12 entities involved in the ROK’s CT efforts, seeking further clarification on and understanding of each entity’s operations, procedures, and response measures to BSM challenges, and additional measures related to COVID-19 containment. Through the questionnaire and discussions, the project’s experts were able to gain a robust understanding of the ROK’s institutions, policies and practices related to BSM and how they have evolved over time.

From the findings, a team of experts distilled a list of good practices exemplified by the ROK that may advise other states on ways to strengthen border security and management networks. These include:

- Establishing flexible and close-knit CT inter-agency coordination;
- Enacting legislation for CT activities and increased border security;
- Developing consistent border surveillance mechanisms for early detection of suspicious activity and/or actors;
- Facilitating intelligence sharing to prevent foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from entering the country and improving regional CT efforts;

- Designing and conducting appropriate and effective CT and BSM training activities;
- Ensuring the responsible use and sharing of biometrics; and
- Providing human rights protections and reporting mechanisms for all CT and BSM practices.

Furthermore, the design and oversight of the ROK's CT and BSM infrastructure allows for constant evaluation and adaptation to meet new or heightened challenges in the security environment. Modifications it was able to make to meet the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic included:

- Adapting BSM and immigration policies to significantly strengthen health-related precautions and enhance inter-agency coordination at all levels;
- Elevating the authority of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) to expand response and policymaking capacity;
- Utilizing Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for early widespread testing, contact tracing, and emergency information dissemination; and
- Establishing Test, Trace, and Treatment (3T) capacity for pathogen carriers from abroad after careful situational analysis.

The ROK's approach to CT and BSM is instructive and can serve as a guide for other countries when developing new or revised policies to increase capacity in these areas for a future where both traditional and nontraditional threats are growing. Based on the good practices and recommendations highlighted in this report, the UNOCT/UNCCT, in partnership with the MOFA-led ROK government contingency, plans to conduct a series of capacity-building training activities in the coming years. After all, terrorism and infectious diseases are both examples of how one country's policies can have transnational and far-reaching effects. Working together to prevent and respond to these challenges can contribute to a more secure world.

Good Practices and Recommendations

Part I: Republic of Korea's Counterterrorism Good Practices for Border Security and Management

1. Establishing joint inter-agency coordination centres.
 - a. Establishing “control tower”-like bodies that convene all agencies and entities who may play a role in the work, and utilizing this control tower body to identify organizational strengths and lines of delegation;
 - b. Ensuring regular, scheduled meetings and other open channels of communication;
 - c. Outlining a chain of command or activation plan for emergency and crisis situations at borders so that roles and responsibilities are effectively outlined and followed on short and immediate notice; and
 - d. Setting up the infrastructure for liaising between the centralized control tower body and other agencies and entities.
2. Enacting legislation for CT activities and increased border security. Examine legislation to identify:
 - a. What national security priorities—particularly those related to BSM—are not covered in existing legislation;
 - b. Where gaps exist in perceived needs versus operational authority and flexibility;
 - c. If the capacity needs of government agencies and affiliated entities are being met or hindered by regulations currently in place; and
 - d. Where preventive policies can be crafted to lay groundwork for swift action if a need arises.
3. Establishing consistent border surveillance mechanisms and procedures for early detection of suspicious activities and actors.
 - a. Equipping government-run and privately-run ports with the same surveillance capabilities to ensure fewer holes or blind spots in monitoring technologies;
 - b. Connecting surveillance and closed-circuit television (CCTV) rooms with hotlines to relevant emergency response and intelligence entities to enable quick communication; and
 - c. Building relationships with nearby communities and operational-level officials to increase community awareness of the dangers and indicators of potential and unfolding terrorist attacks.
4. Facilitating intelligence sharing to prevent FTFs from entering the country and improving regional CT efforts.
 - a. Developing subcommittees of entities with similar jurisdictions to avoid information slipping through the cracks;
 - b. Setting up a program like iAPI that cross-checks incoming and transit passengers with the International Crime Police Organization (INTERPOL) and other international organization databases; and

- c. Establishing channels of communication with INTERPOL and international intelligence and counterterrorism organizations to ensure accurate and up-to-date knowledge is being received and transmitted.
5. Designing and conducting appropriate and effective CT and BSM training activities.
 - a. Emphasizing and mandating regular training and continuing education for all staff, not just new;
 - b. Frequently updating curriculum and mandating regular/recurring training to ensure that knowledge of policies and procedures are up to date given emerging technologies, procedures, and challenges;
 - c. Coordinating wide-scale training exercises and simulations to field-test the viability and feasibility of inter-agency cooperation and communication in realistic circumstances;
 - d. Participating in and conducting international and regional exercises to gain knowledge of other country's best practices and promote readiness for regional responses; and
 - e. Incorporating civilian training and education programs into the CT structure to allow for effective, multi-faceted, and targeted crisis responses.
 6. Ensuring the responsible use and sharing of biometrics at borders.
 - a. Codifying legal mechanisms to maintain the ethical collection and sharing of biometric data;
 - b. Establishing an extensive database of fingerprints and facial scans to more quickly and effectively cross-check passengers with those of interest only if strong safeguards for that biometric data can be established; and
 - c. Training inspection officers to identify key characteristics of fraudulent travel and identification documents to bolster immigration security procedures.
 7. Providing human rights protections and reporting mechanisms for all CT and BSM practices.
 - a. Establishing an independent advisory or consultative entity to evaluate and examine current and forthcoming policies and practices for compliance with international human rights standards;
 - b. Communicating such policies and channels for recourse in a proactive and accessible way, especially to foreign populations and in and around ports of entry; and
 - c. Ensuring that there is a swift process for resolving and handling issues once they are identified and corroborated.

Part II: Republic of Korea's COVID-19 Pandemic-Related Good Practices for Border Security and Management

8. Adapting BSM and immigration policies to strengthen health-related precautions and enhance inter-agency coordination at all levels.
 - a. Enforcing widespread guidelines for quarantine and testing to control for outside factors and variables; and
 - b. Setting up regular task force meetings with relevant committees and officers to stay abreast of evolving epidemic information and working through challenges and obstacles that current anti-epidemic and treatment measures are facing.
9. Elevating the authority of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency to expand response and policymaking capacity.
 - a. Building capacity and resources—in terms of trained professionals, operating staff, and financial resources—to ensure an effective and nationwide response;
 - b. Incorporating foundational regulations such as quarantine and epidemic measures into existing measures to be swiftly adapted to any evolving threat; and
 - c. Establishing one coordinating body that can properly delegate response measures to relevant sub-entities that are best equipped to handle each facet of a challenge.
10. Utilizing ICT for early widespread testing, contact tracing, and emergency information dissemination.
 - a. Implementing procedures pre-boarding to collect crucial information on incoming passengers to cross-check with relevant data points that are agile enough to adapt for a variety of needs and scenarios; and
 - b. Analyzing current passenger information mechanisms and determining where additional needed information collection (such as COVID-related symptoms and testing records) can be integrated into existing systems.
11. Establishing 3T capacity for pathogen carriers from abroad after careful situational analysis.
 - a. Building capacity for widespread and timely virus testing to help assess the scale of the problem and identify infections quickly;
 - b. Ensuring that establishments have effective and easy to use contact tracing mechanisms available to notify patrons of possible exposures, improve enforcement of quarantine measures, and disseminate emergency information in quick and efficient ways; and
 - c. Making treatment options readily available at national and local levels, especially building capacity in the regional and county hospitals to make treatment accessible to the whole population.

Introduction

In 2016, the UNCCT and the Global Counterterrorism Forum published a manual of good practices regarding effective BSM in the context of CT activities.¹ The report aimed to assist UN Member States in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant UN Security Council resolutions to address the overall challenges posed by porous borders, especially long remote green border areas between States. The manual provided guidance for developing policies, programs, and approaches for effective BSM to strengthen cross-border cooperation and border surveillance in a CT context. All Member States were encouraged to consider using these non-binding good practices, while recognizing that implementation must be consistent with applicable international law, as well as national laws and regulations, and could be adapted to accommodate specific regional and sub-regional realities and needs.

This addendum builds on that initial 2016 report and uses the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a case study on how the country, where the perceived threat of terrorism is low, has built a strong counterterrorism culture, especially in terms of BSM. While many countries find themselves establishing CT policies and practices only after a major incident has taken place, the ROK has been steadily building its capacity to prevent and respond to potential future acts. This includes creating the legal foundations and parameters for taking action, building the organizational structures to coordinate such actions, and facilitating an environment for regular consultation and evaluation to enhance preparedness and adapt to the times.

The ROK was also chosen for its notable handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The outbreak of the of COVID-19 pandemic and related public health response measures have had an unprecedented global impact. At the height of the pandemic, the movement of goods and people came largely to a halt. Supply chains were disrupted, causing economic shocks around the world. Many countries also closed their borders to travelers, often with blanket bans on passengers from certain countries or regions, regardless of individual passengers' health status. However, the ROK's BSM infrastructure and culture of inter-agency cooperation enabled the country to make swift adjustments to its BSM policies and practices during the pandemic to allow for additional health screening measures, ultimately preventing the need to close its borders to travelers.

Understanding how efforts to contain a global pandemic intersect with terrorism and transnational crime at the national and regional levels can provide important lessons for dealing for combatting future global challenges, especially those involving bioterrorism or even future epidemics.

Research for this project was conducted over the course of a year, including two country visits in 2021—one technical scoping mission and one Expert Group Meeting²—to identify the ROK's

1 "Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counterterrorism and Stemming the Flow of 'Foreign Terrorist Fighters,'" UN Counter-Terrorism Centre and Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2016.

2 The group of experts included representatives from the following organizations in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea: United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), International

legal framework and operational procedures on BSM and main challenges in implementing CT measures, as well as to understand the special response measures and procedures adopted to heighten BSM during the pandemic. A detailed questionnaire was also distributed to 12 entities involved in the ROK's CT efforts, seeking further clarification on and understanding of each entity's operations, procedures, and response measures to BSM challenges, and additional measures taken related to COVID-19 containment. Through the questionnaire and subsequent discussions with ROK government agencies and think tanks, the project's experts were able to gain a robust understanding of the country's policies and practices in place and how they have evolved over time.³

This compendium highlights some of the ROK's good practices on BSM, in the context of both CT and pandemic response, to serve as a guide for other governments as they develop new policies or seek to improve existing approaches to effective border security. While parts of the ROK's history and geography are unique, there are lessons to be learned from its experiences that can be instructive for other countries needing to adapt to an evolving security landscape.

The Republic of Korea's Counterterrorism Efforts from 1981 to 2015

The ROK's government-level CT efforts began in 1981, when Seoul was chosen to be the host city of the 24th Olympic Games. The terrorist attack at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, which resulted in the deaths of eleven athletes and one police officer, was top of mind when planning the Seoul Olympics. Preventing a similar attack from occurring on Korean soil was of utmost importance and the ROK government enacted and implemented the *National Counterterrorism Guidelines* as the 47th Presidential Decree in January 1982 in preparation for both the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympics.

Before the *National Counterterrorism Guidelines* was adopted, CT activities in the ROK were mainly conducted to address two issues: 1) preventing and countering attacks against civilians under the *United Defense Act*; and 2) maintaining public safety via the Korean National Police. Seoul's selection as Olympic host created a new CT mandate—protecting the Olympic participants against potential terrorist attacks.

Under the *Guidelines*, the National Committee for Counterterrorism (chaired by the Prime Minister) and Working Committee for Counterterrorism (chaired by a Director General in the National Intelligence Service [NIS]) were established. Although the *Guidelines* served as the primary legal basis for these committees' actions—and were established by the first presidential

Organization for Migration (IOM), World Customs Organization (WCO), Henry L. Stimson Center, Migration Research & Training Centre (MRTC), and the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS).

3 In-person meetings and/or site visits were conducted with the following entities: the National Counterterrorism Center, Ministry of National Defense, National Intelligence Service, Korea Immigration Service within the Ministry of Justice, (Korean) National Police Agency, Korea Customs Service, Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Korea Coast Guard. Ministries that were unable to meet with the expert group—the Korea Center for Disease Control and Prevention and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport—provided additional written responses to the follow-up questions posed by the mission participants.

decree concerning countering attacks from international terrorist organizations—its jurisdiction did not extend to all relevant government agencies involved in CT activities.

The next major milestone driving the ROK to strengthen its CT practices was the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001. This horrific act was a wake-up call for all states to strengthen CT efforts. The United Nations Security Council urged its Member States to participate in efforts to counter and prevent terrorism worldwide. As part of elevated efforts to combat global terrorism, the ROK joined other countries in enacting or revising their respective CT-related legislation.

This process was not without its challenges, however. For instance, the NIS submitted a new CT bill to the 16th National Assembly session in 2003, which passed the review process within the Intelligence Committee, but was discarded the following year when the term of the 16th National Assembly expired.

The kidnapping and execution of ROK citizen Sun-il Kim in Iraq in 2004, however, renewed the ROK's focus on strengthening CT framework and culture. Three different CT-related bills were submitted to the 17th National Assembly, although those bills made little progress during the that session and were also discarded as the 17th National Assembly's term ended in 2008. Finally, in March 2016, the Act on Counterterrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Safety was presented and passed at the regular session of the 19th National Assembly, establishing the legal framework for CT activities that is in place today.

The Republic of Korea's Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security: 2016-Present

The Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security was designed to protect Korean citizens “and to ensure national and public security against terrorism by and prescribing matters necessary for the prevention of terrorism, counter-terrorism activities, etc. compensation for damage, etc. caused by terrorism.”⁴ Enacted in 2016, this was the first CT-related legislation to enter into force in the ROK, codifying definitions, responses, and ramifications for acts of terror.

The act defines what is considered a terrorist attack, and outlines what are defined as terrorist suspects, groups, and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). In addition to delineating key terms and classifications, the act defines the jurisdiction of state and local governments, and organizes committees and roles to support nationwide CT efforts. Notably, this act established the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC), the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, and office for a Counter-Terrorism Human Rights Protection Officer.

The NCTC, established under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister on June 4, 2016, was formed as a group of public officials from relevant agencies to oversee and coordinate all administrative,

⁴ ROK Office for Government Policy Coordination, *The Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security*, Article 1, March 2016.

cooperative, and policy decisions relating to counterterrorism activities and terrorism response measures. The National Counterterrorism Committee, comprised of heads of relevant agencies and the Prime Minister, is decreed to support this work by resolving challenges to CT efforts and developing CT policies and activities such as holding and presiding over biannual and ad hoc contingency meetings.

The act also establishes the jurisdiction to collect information on terrorism suspects—such as travel itinerary in and out of the ROK, financial transactions, and other communication methodologies—to monitor and prevent FTFs from entering or leaving the ROK, and punitive measures for those involved, associated with, or in the process of forming terrorist groups. Protection mechanisms and rewards for informants are also established, as are compensation measures for those affected by acts of terror.

Part I: The Republic of Korea's Counterterrorism Good Practices for Border Security and Management

1. Establishing joint CT inter-agency coordination centres.

In the context of building a strong CT culture, inter-agency cooperation is essential to effective border security and management. This encompasses coordination at all levels of government—central, regional, and local—particularly in exchange of information, discussion of lessons learned and good practices, training efforts, and resource-sharing. Terrorist organizations, criminal groups, and other pressing threats can more easily exploit border security mechanisms if the various actors involved in BSM are not harmonized, and roles are not clearly defined. As noted in a 2018 UNOCT report on border security and management good practices, inter-agency cooperation is not predicated on building of “formal oversight structures, [development of] a centralized planning process, nor [homogenizing] agencies so that they function and react in the same manner,” but rather established by “regular interaction and the timely exchange of information,” stressing the need for consistent and open means of communication.⁵

In 2016, the ROK government established the NCTC to act as a control tower for coordinating, evaluating and designing CT prevention and response efforts. This body was established by the Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security and is under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office, giving it the highest level of administrative authority.

The NCTC is comprised of 35 members, dispatched from 19 relevant ministries, to deal with various types of terrorism activities. Several of the members serve on loan to the NCTC for a two- to three-year term, and also serve as a liaison back to their home offices.

The NCTC meets with the Prime Minister twice a year to report on progress, evaluate performance, and set goals for the next six months, ensuring a high level of attention is maintained on this issue, an inter-agency inclusive evaluation and goal-setting process, and a dynamic policymaking process that can adapt to new challenges and threats.

There are four main divisions within the NCTC that reflect the body's prevention, preparation, and response mandates: General Planning, Cooperation and Coordination, Safety Management, and a 24/7 “Situation Room.” There is an overarching emphasis on cooperation and information-sharing among the divisions as well as other associated committees and organizations.

When responding to an event, the NCTC's CT headquarters has pre-designated which ministries or agencies will lead efforts based on the target of the terrorist threat. For threats on foreign soil,

⁵ United Nations, Office of Counter-Terrorism and Global Counterterrorism Forum, Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counterterrorism and Stemming the Flow of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” New York, 2016

for instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge; the Ministry of National Defense (MND) leads responses to threats against military facilities; the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MOLIT) against airports; the Korea Coast Guard to maritime threats; and the Korean National Policy Agency (KNPA) to threats on domestic soil. While these entities take point on initial responses, the Prime Minister has jurisdiction to send additional support or authorize a change in the lead agency if necessary.

For instance, if a hostage incident occurred on domestic soil, it would be first reported to the KNPA. The KNPA would then share with the Korea Fire Service, among other operational agencies, who would then be dispatched into action. The NCTC and Presidential Office would simultaneously be informed, bringing the information to the Prime Minister, who would then initiate a National Counterterrorism Committee meeting to evaluate the situation and delegate tasks across involved agencies to minimize casualties and provide protection to ROK citizens.

Field command headquarters have also been set up in cities and provinces around the country to support response efforts, ensuring local-level resources and cooperation. This could include providing supplies, aiding in resident evacuation efforts, or other matters requiring additional and localized support. When a terrorist event occurs, five additional specialty teams can also be activated as the situation progresses to respond to different challenges. They include the Counterterrorism Special Unit, Terror Response Rescue Team, Counterterrorism Special Duties Team, Military Counterterrorism Special Duties Team, and the Counterterror Joint Investigative Team.

While terrorism is not common in the ROK, the NCTC also leads efforts to design and execute large-scale exercises to ensure the inter-agency process and chains of command are clear and effective, and to help prevent complacency from setting in. Exercises are also broadcast to the public, to build public confidence in the government's ability to respond to act of terrorism.

Overall, the establishment of the NCTC creates a centralized body for inter-agency cooperation on the prevention, preparedness, and response to terrorism-related activity, enabling cooperation on a variety of levels for policy formulation, information sharing, and on-the-ground activities.

Commitment to inter-agency cooperation is made successful by a variety of practices that states can implement, including:

- **Establishing “control tower”-like body that convene all agencies and entities who may play a role in the work and utilizing this control tower body to identify organizational strengths and lines of delegation;**
- **Ensuring regular, scheduled meetings and other open channels of communication;**
- **Outlining a chain of command or activation plan at borders for emergency and crisis situations so that roles and responsibilities are effectively outlined and followed on short and immediate notice; and**
- **Setting up the infrastructure for liaising between the centralized control tower body and other agencies and entities.**

2. Enacting legislation for CT activities and increased border security.

Through the enactment of the Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security in 2016, the ROK has established a clear definition of what it considers an act of terrorism, including a list of activities “carried out for the purpose of impeding the exercise of the authority of the State, a local government, or a foreign government. or for the purpose of causing it to conduct any affair which is not obligatory on it or threatening the public.” It also provides definitions for what is considered a “terrorist group,” “terrorist suspect,” “foreign terrorist fighter,” “funds for terrorism,” as well as definitions for what constitutes “counter-terrorism activities,” and “counter-terrorism investigations.”⁶

The Act also grants legal authority to specific entities and organizations to act as needed to prevent, prepare for, and respond to terrorist threats and acts; and set up a central body to coordinate, evaluate, and design or modify such actions. Furthermore, the codification of these measures elevates CT and border security efforts as a crucial component of overall national security policies and practices.

When designing the legal structure for such activities, it is important to provide enough clarity to ensure the system has a clear mandate and that proper limits and protections against abuse are in place. At the same time, some flexibility is needed to respond and adapt to a range of possible scenarios; understanding where flexibility is built in and what falls outside of that jurisdiction and thus would require a new law is equally important. For the ROK, regular evaluation and inclusive consultation and planning processes help ensure the inter-agency teams are aware of policies and can help identify areas where the law needs to be modified or amended going forward to improve efficiency and performance.

While dependent on individual national circumstances and legislative systems, having a law in place that elevates the importance of an issue to national security and lays an adequate framework for agencies to respond to crises lays a solid legal and procedural foundation for an effective and swift response. States should examine existing legislation to identify:

- **What national security priorities—particularly those related to BSM—are not covered in existing legislation;**
- **Where gaps exist in perceived needs versus operational authority and flexibility;**
- **If the capacity needs of government agencies and affiliated entities are being met or hindered by regulations currently in place; and**
- **Where preventive policies can be crafted to lay groundwork for swift action if a need arises.**

⁶ ROK Office for Government Policy Coordination, *The Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security*, Article 2, March 2016.

3. Developing consistent border surveillance mechanisms for early detection of suspicious activities and actors.

Developing comprehensive and consistent monitoring protocols for border areas and ports of entry—seaports and airports—is an important CT practice. The purpose of such surveillance is two-fold; not only will a widespread monitoring presence deter FTFs and domestic terrorists from acting near borders (or engaging in illicit entry or transport of goods), but it also increases general awareness of potential threats and dangers in the immediate communities. Most effective border surveillance mechanisms have both stationary and mobile units to be agile and cover as much ground and infrastructure as possible, with the number of operational-level officials right-sized to the magnitude of transnational threats at each point of entry. A clear legal framework for all surveillance activities should be in place, with strong human rights safeguards.

Border security monitoring also includes building relationships with local border communities, engaging in such activities as hosting public information sessions on security good practices, and assessing the needs of the local communities in the case of a crisis. This local-level engagement also builds public trust, making it more likely for residents to report suspicious or irregular activities around them.

The KCS conducts 24/7 surveillance of its ports at each facility, including integrated surveillance systems between government-run and privately-run ports. This includes the use of vehicle and object scanning technologies, and surveillance security checks on both passengers and staff. Cargo manifests on ships both arriving in and in transit through the ROK are analyzed by KCS; some ships are selected for additional screening as needed. Findings from this analysis and further screening are reported to KCS Headquarters, and if necessary, are shared with CT councils and other relevant entities.

Airport security is another crucial checkpoint for border security mechanisms. The Incheon Airport was the recipient of the World's Best Airport Security Award in 2021 by Skytrax Magazine.⁷ In addition to Incheon, most airports across the country are well-equipped with advanced security screening technologies to properly search passengers, baggage, and cargo to detect unauthorized or restricted items. Officers regularly attend security training courses to improve skills and maintain knowledge on new security threats, technology trends, and security protocols and processes.

The Korea Immigration Service (KIS) under the Ministry of Justice also operates constant surveillance of airports, while MOLIT has oversight responsibility for passenger and baggage security screening, cargo security control, and security surveillance over restricted areas throughout airports country wide. The NIS provides daily terrorism-related trend reports and watchlists. Screening rooms in airports monitor 24/7 CCTV footage and have hotlines to airport security agents to quickly communicate if a situation arises.

⁷ "Airport of the Year Winners," Skytrax World Airport Awards, accessed December 13, 2021, <https://www.worldairportawards.com/airport-of-the-year-winners/>.

While the ROK's border surveillance efforts are centered around ports and airports, the country still employs successful surveillance techniques that can be implemented in other states to effectively monitor entrance and exit points, including:

- Equipping government-run and privately-run ports with the same surveillance capabilities to ensure fewer holes or blind spots in monitoring technologies;
- Connecting surveillance and CCTV rooms with hotlines to relevant emergency response and intelligence entities to enable quick communication; and
- Building relationships with nearby communities and operational-level officials to increase community awareness of the dangers and indicators of potential and unfolding terrorist attacks.

4. Facilitating intelligence sharing to prevent FTFs from entering the country and improving regional CT efforts.

While certain mechanisms—such as regular and ad-hoc NCTC meetings—establish concrete means and channels of communication, the ROK has worked to integrate other more regular and frequent means of information and intelligence sharing into its BSM framework.

The around-the-clock NCTC Situation Room contains hotlines with all relevant, associated member agencies among other entities, such as the Presidential Office, NIS, MOFA, and Ministry of the Interior and Security (MOIS). This mechanism enables information to be shared in near-real time during crisis situations, though does not need to be utilized continuously.

The NIS also convenes an Airport and Harbor Counter-Terrorism Council comprised of representatives from relevant border security entities, including the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF), KCG, as well as private border security corporations. This committee meets as frequently as possible to share information and disseminate intelligence on potential threats and actors. Each agency has its own information system and reports back to its respective home office. The NIS also writes a Daily Counterterrorism Briefing covering any updates to ongoing investigations or pertinent findings. This briefing is distributed to relevant ministries and branches of the NIS to keep all necessary parties abreast of evolving situations and updated information on potential FTFs.

Often, information needs to be transmitted quickly when dealing with identifying and evaluating whether passengers travelling into the ROK could be FTFs. This calls for close cooperation and information sharing between the MOJ and NIS. The NIS determines whether a suspect is potentially an FTF and launches investigations, sharing information with the MOJ immediately if intervention in the immigration process is needed.

Information sharing is not limited to inter-agency cooperation; many ROK ministries have communication channels with INTERPOL and other overseas law enforcement, intelligence and investigative bodies as well.

For instance, the Korea Immigration Service (KIS) has implemented the use of Interactive Advanced Passenger Information (iAPI), a system in which airlines send all passenger information to KIS 72 hours in advance of a flight to an airport in the ROK. This is cross-checked with information from NIS and INTERPOL on high-risk passengers, to determine whether the passenger is “cleared” or “not cleared” for entry into the ROK. The KIS also regularly shares trends in counterfeit documents and good practices for identifying forged paperwork with over 30 countries, and conducts practical training on document analysis for domestic and international partners. Information from INTERPOL is updated in KIS databases in real-time. Several ROK entities also have memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with foreign counterterrorism and intelligence agencies, which lay the foundation for information exchange, intelligence-sharing, and good practices for training.

The KNPA in particular has MOUs that facilitate intelligence-sharing, and has established contacts throughout Southeast Asia and the Middle East to forge cooperative relationships in other regional interests. ROK intelligence entities exchange terrorism-relevant information via a 24/7 cooperation channel with US, Japanese, Chinese, and other agencies with similar missions. Other centralized channels—such as INTERPOL—serve as a database for all countries’ intelligence, such as identified FTFs, the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database, and Red Notices. Several relevant ROK agencies have access to and contribute to these information systems.

Alongside information agreements, taking part in or conducting international training and regional exercises can enhance national and regional response capabilities, and share good practices and techniques with other countries. Perhaps the largest example of this in the ROK is with the 707th Special Mission Group, the ROK’s elite military CT unit. The 707th Special Mission Group has a state-of-the-art training facility where other, similar CT units can also conduct simulations and real-time exercises, as well as classroom-based training. Often, ROK CT groups are sent to overseas conferences or training sessions on good practices for CT activities.

While seemingly a simple component to implement, information-sharing with intergovernmental and intragovernmental organizations is crucial for maintaining the most accurate and whole picture of suspected or high-risk FTFs and their movement. To ensure this, states should consider:

- **Developing subcommittees of entities with similar jurisdictions to avoid information slipping through the cracks; and**
- **Setting up a program like iAPI that cross-checks incoming and transit passengers with INTERPOL and other international organization databases; and**
- **Establishing channels of communication with INTERPOL and international intelligence and counterterrorism organizations to ensure accurate and up-to-date knowledge is being received and transmitted.**

5. Designing and conducting appropriate and effective CT and BSM training activities.

In efforts to maintain a high level of preparedness, regular, thorough, and realistic trainings for operational-level officials is crucial to remaining poised to respond to threats and crises, and for maintaining sound security practices more generally. While the ROK typically experiences few instances of domestic and/or foreign terrorism, training is still important—if not even more so—to successful prevention and, if necessary, response. Having so many entities involved in CT efforts necessitates both individual, siloed training to refine capabilities and joint training efforts to rehearse overall communication flow and cooperative response.

The NCTC conducts the largest joint training in the ROK CT network of entities, hosting the Annual Joint Exercise every fall. Relevant agencies and Special Forces—such as police units, fire departments, and the ROK Navy—all take part in the exercise. Preparation for the event begins two months in advance, creating a scenario for participants to work through as a unit, practicing communication and cooperative response. The 2021 scenario took place on a boat with a staged hostage situation and a concurrent attack in a nearby area of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) nature. The annual joint exercise is also open to public viewing and broadcasted online, to build public confidence in and awareness of the CT measures in place throughout the country. In addition to this exercise, the NCTC conducts yearly operational-level drills and exercises in the months preceding the annual joint exercise.

The MND also conducts trainings in preparation to meet both traditional and non-traditional terrorist threats, especially sharing expertise with civilian sectors. The 707th Special Mission Group has a well-equipped training facility where civilians and international CT groups are brought in to conduct exercises and participate in other specialized training courses, such as explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), chemical and biological threats, and CT special forces.

Over the last ten years, the 707th Special Mission Group has conducted more than 72 overseas trainings. Candidates for these MND-sponsored trainings are selected by the agencies requiring training for new or existing employees. Training performance is scored, and performance is reported to each respective ministry, incentivizing commitment and serious participation. Regional CT units also conduct police and fire-fighting training, and the MND shares military know-how and resources. Civilian integration into military CT protocols provides a well-integrated system that is scalable to both localized and larger-scale situations.

The KNPA also conducts a few annual training programs focused on combatting FTFs. During these trainings, CT experts from overseas are invited to present on cases that they have worked and any resulting lessons learned. Frequently, KNPA officers attend overseas CT conferences, with training in lecture-, scenario-, and simulation-based activities. While the frequency of these educational opportunities has been limited during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the infrastructure and relationships are in place once international activity is safer to resume.

While training is an effective way to maintain preparedness for crisis-like situations, there is no match for testing response processes in real-time. The ROK's strict gun control laws and low

rate of private gun ownership make training and testing on potential firearm and ammunition threats of particularly high priority for Korean Customs officers. The Korea Customs Service operates “undercover” testing in over 30 airports and seaports by placing ammunition or firearm components—with passenger consent—in a passenger or sailor’s luggage to test if field officers will catch and respond properly to them. These mock tests were conducted over 200 times in 2021, a testament to the frequency with which these tests occur and the KIS’ dedication to training. While officers identified most of the items designated as security hazards, training and testing are ongoing in this area, especially as new systems and models are added to the database.

The KCS also conducts monthly training on efficiently and effectively utilizing small x-ray systems to detect illegal items in cargo. Twice a year, the KCS runs x-ray training for new staff, delivering in-depth training on examining and analyzing x-ray images, in which customs officers that are new or have less than three years of experience are trained by experienced lecturers on what to look for when interpreting passenger or cargo images.

In addition to field-testing, KCS also conducts “big data” training for all officers, providing information and identification techniques for illicit items. The MND has collected an extensive and ever-evolving database of specs, images, and other identifiers of illegal items that can aid officers in detection.

The MOF sponsors an annual comprehensive training for public and private security officers for port security and facility-by-facility training once a quarter. In addition to conducting actual training courses, MOF sponsors security exams once per year for officers at each facility and provides a comprehensive plan with recommendations pending the results of the assessments. This ensures that a standard baseline of security knowledge and expertise is being followed across ports.

Training for evolving and more non-traditional threats is also imperative for maintaining a robust investigative branch of response networks. The Korean Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) works to expand resources and education for epidemiological investigators, central and local governments, and other relevant organizations to respond to and serve as an authority on chemical and bioterrorism and infectious diseases. As the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated evolving travel and quarantine restrictions, public health centers and local government epidemiological investigation teams were given online courses to maintain readiness and stay up to date on effective and safe protocols for managing quarantine procedures and containing the virus’ spread. This demonstrated the need for training—at a whole-of-government level—on evolving threats to be better prepared for predictable future crisis situations like future epidemics.

Developing robust trainings and exercises that include both inter-agency and public-private cooperation and coordination is essential for effective crisis readiness and response. To foster this type of engagement and education, states should consider:

- **Emphasizing and mandating regular training and continuing education for all staff, not just new staff;**

- Frequently updating curriculum and mandating regular/recurring training to ensure that knowledge of policies and procedures are up to date given emerging technologies, procedures, and challenges;
- Coordinating wide-scale training exercises and simulations to field-test the viability and feasibility of inter-agency cooperation and communication in realistic circumstances;
- Participating and conducting international and regional exercises to gain knowledge of other country's good practices and promote readiness for regional responses; and
- Incorporating civilian training and education programs into the CT structure so as to allow for effective, multi-faceted, and targeted crisis responses.

6. Ensuring the responsible use and sharing of biometrics at borders.

UN Security Council Resolution 2322 (2016) calls on all UN Member States to share important biometric and biographical information on FTFs and other individual terrorists or those associated with UN-identified terrorist organizations. A 2017 resolution determined that Member States need to “develop and implement systems to collect biometric data, in compliance with domestic law and international human rights law,” which includes information associated with fingerprints and facial recognition data.⁸ These data are to be shared with other Member States, INTERPOL, and other international bodies in order to effectively identify terrorists in a way that aligns with international human rights laws and norms.

In 2011, the ROK implemented the Biometrics Analysis System for Experts (BASE) to track foreign nationals' biometric data—fingerprints and facial recognition—as a part of standard customs and immigrations procedures, such as visa applications, entry inspection, and information-sharing requests from relevant intergovernmental agencies. This database has been expanded and updated over the past several years for increased speed and accuracy of analysis. The Immigration Act lays the groundwork for provisions to collect fingerprints and facial recognition information under Article 12-2.⁹

The Korea Immigration Service Document Examination Section (KIDES) at the Incheon International Airport began to utilize biometric data for document verification (matching photographs on identification with a read of passenger's facial features) in 2010, and specifically

8 United Nations, Office of Counter-Terrorism, Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, and Biometrics Institute, United Nations Compendium of recommended practices for the responsible use and sharing of biometrics in counter-terrorism, New York, 2018, page 8, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/terrorism/Compendium-Biometrics/Compendium-biometrics-final-version-LATEST_18_JUNE_2018_optimized.pdf.

9 ROK Government, Immigration Act, Article 12-2, October 2014, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=33079&lang=ENG.

BASE soon thereafter. As a result, the number of unidentifiable passengers has decreased from 4,813 in 2019 to 2,514 in 2021. Biometric data is updated in real-time, but an authentication division exists on the back-end to check for errors or system failures.

The Smart Entry System (SES) for airport entry is available as part of the Integrated Border Management System (IBMS) ecosystem and aims to minimize time spent in customs and immigration for incoming passengers. Utilizing both an ePassport and biometric reader, Korean nationals and foreign nationals can participate in the program, though foreign nationals must register with the ROK government to participate. In 2019, 40 percent of entrants into the ROK used SES; in 2018, all foreign nationals departing Korea were required to use SES. However, the COVID-19 pandemic eliminated this option.

Plans for biometric data integration include collecting additional unique identifiers—specifically, iris scans—and establishing a “Big Data Division” under KIS that houses an extensive database of foreign national biometric data. This would allow for quicker and more accurate identification of potential FTFs or those associated with international terrorist organizations.

While there is always a risk of hackers to target biometric databases, which could result in identity-based theft or attacks, the ROK takes necessary precautions to mitigate these risks. ROK biometric collection is conducted and shared in accordance with the Personal Information Protection Act.¹⁰ Biometric data is not shared among other inter-governmental entities without a legal basis or a court order. For example, the MOJ can request previously collected biometric data from other entities to use for immigration entry inspections. Fingerprint and facial recognition data are collected from those above the age of 17 entering the ROK unless they have received exemption by Presidential Decree or are in the ROK to perform the duties of a foreign government or international organization.

Biometric data can be key components of accurately identifying potential FTFs. However, to do so, states should consider implementing the following provisions:

- **Codifying legal mechanisms to maintain the ethical collection and sharing of biometric data;**
- **Establishing an extensive database of fingerprints and facial scans to more quickly and effectively cross-check passengers with those of interest only if strong safeguards for that biometric data can be established; and**
- **Training inspection officers to identify key characteristics of fraudulent travel and identification documents to bolster immigration security procedures.**

¹⁰ ROK Government, Personal Information Protection Act, February 2020, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?lang=ENG&hseq=53044.

7. Providing human rights protections and reporting mechanisms for all CT and BSM practices.

UN Member States have an obligation to respect, protect and promote human rights while countering terrorism. All measures in this context must be prescribed by law and regulated against clear and strict guidelines. Mechanisms for reporting human rights violations also need to be both established and made clear to the public to ensure that individuals have an effective remedy when violations have occurred. Oversight mechanisms should also be established to review policies and mandates for compliance with these standards.¹¹

The NCTC, as stipulated by Article 7 of the Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security (2016), is mandated to have one Human Rights Protection Officer specifically tasked to “prevent the infringement of basic rights of the people which may be caused from counter-terrorism activities of related agencies.” The term for this position is typically two years. The Officer is supported by a small team of five to six people, providing administrative and research support based on the Officer’s duties. Despite close ties to the NCTC and the ability to advise on new policy development, the Human Rights Protection Officer remains separate from the NCTC, sits in a different office entirely, and is able to act independently.

The Human Rights Protection Officer oversees four key subsets of duties. They include: advising and recommending where CT policies and processes can be amended to better safeguard human rights; handling civil complaints of human rights violations that have been submitted in response to CT activities; educating relevant agencies and conducting other activities to promote human rights protection in CT activities; and reporting human rights violations stemming from CT activities and consequent corrective measures to the National Counter-Terrorism Committee. In other words, the Officer evaluates policies and practices to ensure they respect and protect individuals’ rights, responds to any reported complaints, and can advise on new policies or further courses of action.

In theory, anyone can file a complaint or a case to the Human Rights Protection Officer Support Team through various channels. The team works to conclude the issue within two months, although may take longer depending on the complexity of the issue at hand. At the end of the two-month period, if the case is still seeking resolution, the Officer must notify the plaintiff of the status of the investigation and what steps will be taken to resolve the issue. If the evaluation is found to have been in violation of the individual’s rights, the Officer then reports the matter to the Chair of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee and recommends a series of corrective measures to the leaders of relevant agencies.

11 UNOCT-UNCCT, Handbook on Human Rights and Screening in Border Security and Management, New York, 2018, <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/human-rights/publications>.

No complaints have been filed to date in the ROK, and proactive investigations into CT-related surveillance practices have so far found no violations of individuals' privacy or rights. However, there is also a recognition that greater information dissemination is needed among foreign populations in the ROK, who may not know to access government websites to find information about rights, contacts or reporting procedures, to educate them about the Human Rights Protection Officer's role and process for filing complaints. This would be especially useful in airports and ports to ensure resources are at hand to those potentially in need.

The presence of a human rights protection officer demonstrates a commitment to ensuring policies and practices respect and ensure the rights of individuals even through the security process, and creates a mechanism for complaints to be heard, investigated, and pursued. For other states, they should consider:

- **Establishing an independent advisory or consultative entity to evaluate and examine current and forthcoming policies and practices for compliance with human rights standards;**
- **Communicating such policies and channels for recourse in a proactive and accessible way, especially to foreign populations and in and around ports of entry; and**
- **Ensuring that there is a swift process for resolving and handling issues once they are identified and corroborated.**


Part II: The Republic of Korea's COVID-19 Pandemic-Related Good Practices for Border Security and Management

8. Adapting BSM and immigration policies to strengthen health-related precautions and enhance inter-agency coordination at all levels.

The ROK's all-of-government response to the COVID-19 pandemic gained global attention. Its swift action and robust inter-agency cooperation enabled the country to keep businesses open and avoid imposing full and prolonged lockdowns while still keeping infection rates commendably low.

The country's BSM policies and practices were amended during this time and also intended to keep the country open for business while still taking increased precautions to contain the pandemic from spreading inside the country. The Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) authorities introduced the "Special Immigration Procedure (SIP)," which was initially designed and implemented to increase inspection measures rather than imposing blanket entry bans on inbound travelers. Information and communication technologies (ICT) enabled quarantine entities to access passenger information reported by the airline. This included increased additional health and pre-screening requirements for entering the country; increased health screenings and on the spot COVID-19 testing at all ports of entry; mandatory quarantine periods for foreigners entering the country with few exceptions; mandatory additional PCR testing on set intervals during an individual's stay in-country; use of ICT for enforcing quarantines and tracking/tracing COVID-19 exposure; along with strict and consistent enforcement of the various new measures put in place.

Special Immigration Procedure (SIP) Flow Chart



During the pandemic, the ROK's CIQ authorities shared personal information of those passengers from high-risk countries with local government authorities for the purpose of ramping up surveillance in tracing suspected cases. However, this type of tracing information was routinely deleted after two months to protect individuals' privacy.

Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the ROK Government's CIQ entities were often criticized for not having an integrated system, which is common practice in other advanced countries.

The ROK's division of CIQ procedures is shown in the below table:

Category	Functions	Main line ministry/ Agency in charge of each function	Related Law
Personnel	Immigration	Ministry of Justice (MOJ) - Korea Immigration Service (KIS)	Immigration Act
		Immigration procedures at borders for both Koreans and Non-Koreans	Immigration
	Quarantine	Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) - The National Quarantine Stations	Quarantine Act
		Prevention of Inflow and Spread of Infectious Diseases	Quarantine
Goods/ Products	Customs	Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) - (Korea Customs Service)	Customs Act
		Tariffications, customs appraisalment and import/export customs clearance	Customs
	Quarantine	KDCA - The National Quarantine Station	(Quarantine Act)
		Quarantines on goods and cargos	Quarantine
	Animal and Plant Quarantine	Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency	(Act On the Prevention of Contagious Animal Diseases)
			(Plant Protection Act)
		(Agricultural And Fishery Products Quality Control Act)	
	Prevention of contagious animal and plants diseases	Quarantine	

However, the ROK government has proven that Integrated Border Management is still possible without physically integrating different government entities into one agency. During the pandemic, the ROK managed to keep the border open and allow the free movement of goods and people, but with increased testing, quarantines, and contact tracing. Closely knit communications and an inter-agency coordination mechanism enabled CIQ procedures to be effectively managed despite their separate jurisdictions.


The Central Disaster Management Headquarters and Central Disease Control Headquarters, under the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) and the KDCA, respectively, hosted regular meetings to discuss evolving COVID-19 conditions and response measures, including strengthening of public communication mechanisms, management of hospital and quarantine facilities, strengthening of cooperation and coordination among relevant organizations and agencies, and new and emerging medical considerations and developments. The KCDC also hosts regular meetings, upholding its duties of supporting risk communication, managing supply and demand of resources and supplies, dispatching epidemiological investigators, and managing monitoring systems of incoming passengers.

In addition, the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters (CDSCH) was established in February 2020 as a provisional committee for emergency response. Given the specific expertise needed for infectious disease response, the Central Disease Control Headquarters (KCDC) serves as the command center for these efforts. The CDSCH is chaired by the Prime Minister, with two Vice Heads: 1) the Minister of Health and Welfare, who assists the Central Disease Control Headquarters, and 2) the Minister of Interior and Safety, who heads the Pan-government Countermeasures Support Headquarters and provides assistance coordinating between central and local governments. Each local government establishes a Local Disaster and Safety Management Headquarters, led by the heads of local governments to facilitate local needs such as ensuring adequate numbers of local infectious diseases hospitals and beds.¹²

Having existing systems in place that can be easily adapted to accommodate for necessary COVID-19 information and restrictions has added to the ROK's effective pandemic border security strategy. There are good practices that can be implemented to control for other factors or to prepare for potential future epidemics. These include:

- **Enforcing widespread guidelines for quarantine and testing to control for outside factors and variables; and**
- **Setting up regular task force meetings with relevant committees and officers to stay abreast of evolving epidemic information and working through challenges and obstacles facing current anti-epidemic and treatment measures.**

¹² "Korean government's response system," Central Disaster Management Headquarters and Central Disease Control Headquarters, Ministry of Health and Welfare, February 25, 2020. http://ncov.mohw.go.kr/en/baroView.do?brdId=11&brdGubun=111&dataGubun=&ncvContSeq=&contSeq=&board_id=



9. Elevating the authority of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency to expand response and policymaking capacity.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the KCDC (under the ROK MOHW) was elevated to agency status, becoming the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency. This increased its ability to respond to the evolving pandemic conditions. With this change, the KDCA gained independent operations, its own human resources department, and its own budget. In practice, this means rather than executing directives from the MOHW, the agency now oversees the jurisdiction of six laws and has the direct authority to expand and enforce disease management policies accordingly. The agency also expanded its workforce by 384 people, increasing its capacity and reach; coordinated with local branch offices across the country; opened five new regional centers to respond to local infectious diseases, including COVID-19; provided diagnostic tests; conducted epidemiological investigations and chronic disease research; and facilitated greater community outreach.

In the context of BSM, the KDCA had preexisting quarantine and epidemic measures in place to be exercised as needed, but these capabilities and regulations were expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic. The KDCA oversees the Special Immigration Procedures and other immigration measures used to minimize the spread of the virus while maintaining open borders. These activities, however, rely heavily on cooperation with the KIS, under the MOJ, and the KCS to monitor the cargo and passengers that flow in and out of the country.

The CDSCH under the Prime Minister's Office serves as a control tower on infectious disease management that fosters and coordinates inter-agency cooperation to accomplish a common mission in partnership with the KDCA. The ROK's commitment to inter-agency cooperation on both national and local levels and across operational, coordination, and policy levels has contributed to its success in preventing and responding to pandemic response challenges.

Having the right institutions in place and recognizing when their positive impact on the situation can be improved by expanded authority can help states prepare for future crises. States should consider the following to prepare for future crises:

- **Building capacity and resources—in terms of trained professionals, operating staff, and financial resources—to ensure an effective and nationwide response;**
- **Incorporating foundational regulations such as quarantine and epidemic measures into existing measures to be swiftly adapted to any evolving threat; and**
- **Establishing one coordinating body that can properly delegate response measures to relevant sub-entities that are best equipped to handle each facet of a challenge.**

10. Utilizing Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for early widespread testing, contact tracing, and emergency information dissemination.

The ROK leveraged its existing ICT systems and procedures to improve passenger screening and facilitate contact tracing, particularly of airline passengers entering and leaving the country.

The IBMS encompasses several sub-immigration procedures that help authorities track and identify who is entering, exiting, and transiting the country. The Interactive Advanced Pass Information (iAPI) was initially implemented in 2015 for domestic airlines and 2017 for all international airlines but has since been adapted to aid with quarantine measures and travel restrictions. Early in the pandemic, this system was used to flag visas issued before April 2020 and passengers with visas from Wuhan, China. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the system was not set to display specific visa information; it only displayed the validity of the travel documents. However, pre-screening visa-related information was useful in helping identify passengers coming from high-risk areas and was added accordingly.

This system is also cross-checked with airline lists pre-boarding. If documents are determined to be invalid, or a passenger is flagged as associated with a UN-registered terrorist organization (or a designated high-risk area during the pandemic), immigration authorities would notify the airlines that the passenger is denied boarding. The adaptation of the iAPI to accommodate information needs during COVID-19 was a crucial component of allowing travel to continue and borders to stay open while keeping a close eye on the inflow of passengers. Officials have shared personal information of those travelers from high-risk countries with local government authorities for the purpose of ramping up surveillance in tracing suspected cases. For privacy concerns, this type of tracing information is deleted after two months of information-storing in the system.

The counterpart to this pre-boarding system is the Advance Pass Information System (APIS), in which the customs and immigration authorities from the final destination country receive passenger information from the airline in advance of landing, so authorities may research and analyze risk factors before the aircraft arrives, and can conduct interviews or baggage inspections as needed.

For passengers from the 112 countries that do not require a visa for entry into the ROK (prior to the COVID-19 pandemic), changes have also been made to better monitor entry patterns and prevent illegal immigration. In September 2021, KIS implemented the K-ETA system. With a small fee, passengers are able to fill out a pre-authorized traveler form that is valid for two years. The K-ETA requires COVID-19-related information, such as vaccination status, travel history and plans, and symptoms and testing results. While currently only rolled out to visa waiver countries that are currently granted entry to the ROK, 60% of users have been US citizens. A form such as the K-ETA allows for KIS to fill in any information gaps on passengers that would not be required to submit other immigration documents prior to entry.

While having existing systems in place that could be easily adapted to accommodate collection of additional COVID-19 related information has helped the ROK's pandemic border security practices, there are good practices that can be implemented to control for other factors or to prepare for potential future epidemics. These include:

- **Implementing procedures pre-boarding to collect crucial information on incoming passengers to cross-check with relevant data points that are agile enough to adapt for a variety of needs and scenarios; and**
- **Analyzing current passenger information mechanisms and determining where additional needed information collection (such as COVID-related symptoms and testing records) can be integrated into existing systems.**

11. Establishing Test, Trace, and Treatment (3T) capacity for pathogen carriers from abroad after careful situational analysis.

Since the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic, the ROK government has managed the influx of infectious pathogen carriers from foreign countries without the need to close its borders. The Test, Trace, and Treatment or “3T” policy has been successfully applied across national and local levels. The whole-of-government approach to pandemic response has helped in tracing infectious pathogen carriers from other countries, and the ROK government provided free treatment to those infected by the virus based on reciprocity.

Testing: From the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, the ROK has prioritized widespread and accessible testing to all citizens; and mandatory testing of foreigners entering the country. In February 2020, daily testing capacity was around 20,000; by the end of the year, the number reached 130,000. At the beginning of 2021, daily testing capacity had risen to around 200,000, and by end of year, was around 750,000. Increasing capacity required testing centers need to be widely available. In February 2020, only 65 testing centers were open; by December 2021, the country had more than 244 testing centers. Moreover, testing results are generally provided within 6-12 hours after receipt, ensuring timely notification to subjects of their infection status but requiring enormous processing capacity and coordination to complete.

Tracing: Jointly developed by the KDCA and MOLIT, the ROK also implemented an Epidemic Investigation Support System (technology-based). This was initially implemented to aid local authorities on urban planning issues involving population flow, traffic, and pollution but was adapted to allow authorities to enter or request information on confirmed cases of COVID-19, allowing for inter-governmental tracing of cases.

In addition, a quick response (QR) code tracing system was enacted in June 2020, called KI Pass. Contact tracing information can be collected at local establishments by scanning a patron’s QR code (via their smartphones) and providing their unique information that authorities can track and match for contact tracing purposes. Once scanned, codes expire in 28 days and are not stored long-term in establishment-level databases.

Foreigners visiting the ROK must download an app to self-check and report symptoms daily. Tracking information can be provided through the app if necessary.

Treatment: The ROK has a preexisting, robust, and established medical response system that was adapted to respond to an increased treatment need for patients infected by the coronavirus. Given the high transmission rate of the virus, beds are organized in accordance with the severity of the patient’s infection. Treatment efforts are organized and coordinated down to the local level, where each city and province have a plan for hospital and intensive care beds.

In addition to the 3T strategy, the inter-ministerial COVID-19 special task force, part of the CDSCH held meetings every Monday chaired by the Prime Minister, allowed progress to be assessed and adjustments to be made in a timely and agile manner.

While prevention is one key component of a successful COVID-19 response, the ROK also ensured testing and treatment were available to the public and employed robust contact tracing to help track and control virus spread. States should consider—for the current pandemic and future epidemic measures:

- Building capacity for widespread and timely virus testing to help assess the scale of the problem and identify infections quickly;
- Ensuring that establishments have effective and easy to use contact tracing mechanisms available to notify patrons of possible exposures, improve enforcement of quarantine measures, and disseminate emergency information in quick and efficient ways; and
- Making treatment options readily available at national and local levels, especially building capacity in regional and county hospitals to make treatment accessible to the whole population.

Conclusion

Although the ROK's border conditions are unique, the government has adopted a number of good BSM practices that have helped the country to prepare, prevent and respond to terrorist activities on the Peninsula. This includes establishing legal foundations, political and operational infrastructure, set procedures and chains of command, and ongoing training to prepare for a number of potential scenarios, no matter how unlikely they are to occur. The culture of inter-agency cooperation, information sharing, and high-level political leadership also enable the country to also adapt these policies to emerging threats, as demonstrated by the ROK's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. While many countries chose to close their borders or impose high restrictions on travel and trade, compounding the social and economic hardships of the pandemic, the ROK was able to quickly adjust its BSM policies to include greater health screening and keep its borders open.

The ROK's approach to CT and BSM is instructive and can serve as guidelines for other countries when developing new or revised policies to increase capacity in these areas for a future where both traditional and nontraditional threats are rising. Based on the good practices and recommendations highlighted in this report, the UNOCT/UNCCT in partnership with the ROK government, headed by the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, plans to conduct a series of capacity building training activities in the coming years. After all, terrorism and infectious diseases are both examples of how one country's policies can have transnational and far-reaching effects; working together to be better prepared to prevent and/or respond to these rising challenges can contribute to a more secure world.

Expert Group

UNOCT/UNCCT, Border Security Management Unit

Through its **Border Security and Management (BSM) Programme**, UNCCT aims to strengthen Member States' capacities to prevent the cross-border movement of terrorists and stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). In January 2019 UNCCT launched its comprehensive new global programme which allows the Centre to provide on-going border management and counter-terrorism expertise to Member States.



Mr. Rocco Messina, Head of BSM Unit

Mr Messina is currently the Head of the BSM Unit at UNCCT/UNOCT managing the implementation of a global BSM programme. Prior to this appointment, Mr Messina served, from 2011 to 2017, as Head of the Border Management Section at the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). He started his professional career in 1990, as a team leader in the Italian Guardia di Finanza focused on border security and counter-terrorism operations.

Mr. Paul (Sang Jun) Jung, Associate Programme Management Officer

Mr. Jung is currently working at the BSM Unit at UNOCT and has over 8 years of experience in the fields of military intelligence and security analysis, political analysis, SDGs capacity-building activities, and international sales and marketing.

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

IOM's Immigration and Border Management (IBM) Division supports Member States in improving the policy, legislation, operational systems, human resources and administrative and technical structures required to respond more effectively to diverse migration and border management challenges. Immigration and Border Management (IBM) activities are in line with IOM's commitment to facilitate orderly, safe and regular migration and mobility.



Mr. Donato Colucci, Head Border and Identity Solution Unit - IOM HQ Geneva

Mr. Colucci is the "Senior Border and Identity Solutions (BIS) Specialist based at the IOM Headquarters in Geneva. He provides to Governmental counterparts expertise, planning and guidance in the development, coordination, and implementation of capacity building initiatives on border and identity solutions, border and migration management policies and strategies, including Integrated Border Management and data collection and analysis. With the United

Nation he was Police Commander of the international airport of Pristine, within the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In Italy, he is a Police Officer from the Central Directorate of Immigration and Border Police of the Italian Ministry of Interior, currently on special leave for serving IOM as an expert on migration management issues.

Mr. Tae-Hyung Kim, Senior Adviser, Immigration and Border Management Direction

Mr. Kim is currently working as Senior Adviser at the IBM Division at IOM. Prior to joining IOM, Mr. Kim has over 16 years of experience at various key positions at the ROK Ministry of Justice. Mr. Kim also worked as Assistant Secretary to the President for Legal Affairs in the Office of the President (ROK). Mr. Kim passed the ROK bar examination in 2008 and passed the examination for higher civil service in 2009.

Stimson Center

The Stimson Center promotes international security, shared prosperity & justice through applied research and independent analysis, deep engagement, and policy innovation. For three decades, Stimson has been a leading voice on urgent global issues. Founded in the twilight years of the Cold War, the Stimson Center pioneered practical new steps toward stability and security in an uncertain world. Today, as changes in power and technology usher in a challenging new era, Stimson is at the forefront: Engaging new voices, generating innovative ideas and analysis, and building solutions to promote international security, prosperity, and justice.



Ms. Jenny Town, Senior Fellow and 38 North Program Director, Stimson Center

Jenny Town is currently a Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center and the Director of Stimson's 38 North Program, which focuses on peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. She has over 15 years working on Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian regional security, especially US-ROK, US-DPRK, and inter-Korean relations. She was named one of Worth Magazine's "Groundbreakers 2020: 50 Women Changing the World" and one of Fast Company's Most Creative People in Business in 2019 for her role in co-founding and managing the 38 North website, which provides policy and technical analysis on North Korea.

Ms. Iliana Ragnone, Research Associate, Stimson Center

Iliana Ragnone is a Research Associate at the Stimson Center in the 38 North Program, which focuses on peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Prior to joining Stimson, she was a Program Assistant at the Foreign Service Institute, a part of the Department of State. She holds a B.A. in International and Area Studies and Chinese Language and Culture from Washington University in St. Louis.

World Customs Organization

The World Customs Organization (WCO) acts as an independent intergovernmental body whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of Customs administrations around the world. Today, the WCO represents 183 Customs administrations across the globe that collectively process approximately 98% of world trade. As the global center of Customs expertise, the WCO is the only international organization with competence in Customs matters and can rightly call itself the voice of the international Customs community.



Mr. James McColm

Jim McColm is the Program Manager of the WCO Security Programme and is responsible for the delivery of the WCO's Strategic Trade Control Enforcement and Small Arms and Light Weapons Project. He has worked for the WCO since 2016 and previously has 29 years of customs experience in the UK where he was responsible for setting up the Counter Terrorist and Radio-Nuclear Intelligence Team in HMCE and the Counterproliferation Team within the UK Border Force.

Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS)

The Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) is a government-funded institute founded in 1977 and located in Seoul, Republic of Korea. Since its foundation, the INSS has played a key role in formulating national security strategies by providing policy options on North Korean issues and other international security matters to the government of the Republic of Korea. Center for Emerging Security Research is the organization's focal point for INSS counter-terrorism research.



Ms. Bora Park, Researcher

Dr. Park is a Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). Dr. Park's main research areas cover transnational crime matters, criminal justice, radicalization and violent extremism that lead to terrorism and counterterrorism policy. She received Ph.D. in Criminology from Dongguk University (ROK).

Migration Research and Training Centre (MRTC)

The Migration Research & Training Centre (MRTC) was established in December 2009 through a special partnership between the Korean Government and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). MRTC has pioneered research and training on migration policy and partnered with organizations in home and abroad to conduct more effective and productive research and training.



Ms. Min Yi Yoo, Researcher

Dr. Yoo is a Research Fellow at Migration Research and Training Centre in ROK. Dr. Yoo's main research areas are policy analysis and evaluation and public management with the focus on border management and immigration policy. Dr. Yoo holds a PhD in Public Policy from Sungkyunkwan University.

List of Annexes

Annex A: [ROK Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security \(2016\)](#)

Annex B: [Scoping Mission Questionnaire](#)

Annex C: [Mobility Crisis and Response in the Time of COVID-19: The Republic of Korea's Approach \(IOM Report, May 2020\)](#)

Annex D: [UNOCT-UNCCT-GCTF, Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counterterrorism and Stemming the Flow of "Foreign Terrorist Fighters"](#)

